WAS CHINGIZ AITMATOV DREAMING OF THIS?

Rasul Jumaly

On the vast open spaces of the CIS for Kazakhstan seems to be no closer country than Kyrgyzstan and this is not only because of geographical location. But neglecting this fact because of the involvement in some ambitious projects, or any other things, we have very superficial judgments about what is happening with our neighbour. But it should not be like this. Not only just because of the long neighbourhood and the interplay of historical fate. Since ancient times neighbours always took the best from each other and avoided the worst. Just to say, the current situation of neighbours, bring no sense of envy. And perhaps it is worth to understand why this has happened.

Kyrgyzstan, as much as, Kazakhstan declared its independence since collapse of USSR in 1991 but it is wrong to assume that the turbulent changes in late 1980’s, that announced the end of «powerful and immense», caught a country of mountains and tulips by surprise. Even then the liberalization of political life was much more intense there than in our country. There were operating 40 public organizations in 1990. The driving force for democratization of society was the movement «Kyrgyzstan».
And even the first president, Askar Akayev, by the way, the only Central Asian leader from academic circles, in the days of Soviet Union agony showed himself as great supporter of democracy and the ideas of sovereignty. These qualities were especially clearly manifested in the last days of the empire agony — the August coup of 1991. Then he was one of the few leaders of the republics (some even sent supportive telegrams to the GCES), who opposed Lubyan’s group that was trying to gain the power and restore Moscow dictatorship. He took the great risk. No one could guarantee that they would fail. “The family of nations” was already falling apart.
After receiving their freedom Kyrgyzstan vigorously started building a market economy. But it was not possible to solve all the socio-economic problems: for the country whose 98% of the exports went to the Union markets, failure of economical links was a disaster. Bishkek recognized their vulnerability in the way of the territorial insularity, poor transportation network, lack of large hydrocarbon deposits and not only domestic but external threats as well.
In these circumstances, emphasis was made on international cooperation. Foreign advisers were invited to the country; dialogue with the IMF was established and State programs for attracting FDI were developed. According to the President, “US, Japan, Germany, Turkey, Switzerland, Netherlands, etc were providing great assistance”.
Dramatic changes occurred in the democratization of public life including party-building. The Parliament has received broad mandate and wide responsibilities. In the international arena, this allowed the Republic to position itself as «island of democracy»
From the pages of the Western press Akayev was described as an exemplary post-Soviet leader. He was met with open arms in Washington and London, Berlin and Paris. He received a lot of epithets and pats on the back. Their mission to advance western standards in the CIS needed a good precedent; Akayev considered as enlightened liberal and was perceived as a winning candidate for this role. As a result, he received effective assistance from international financial institutions, donors in the form of beneficial loans and long-term grants. Bishkek was fully disclosing to the West but pragmatism did allow breaking ties within the CIS members. China fell in the category of major trading partners as well.
It must be recognized that above mentioned factors mitigate the impact of the «jump» in the realities of the market. Kyrgyzstan looked relatively healthy among Central Asian countries and even showed some recovery in 1995-1997. For example, in May 1995, the IMF report pointed out that among the CIS countries Kyrgyz Republic advanced on the path of economic transformation more than anybody else.
 However, divergent and wide scope of diplomacy by a small country often leads to controversial steps in the international arena. Thus, joining World Trade Organization in 1998, apparently because of the West influence, Kyrgyzstan, according to many experts, compromised its participation in the CIS and quick WTO membership hurt the country more than helped. 
Within the limits, of Central Asia, Bishkek actually preferred to move in the wake of Astana. Akayev was largely supporting integration initiatives of the Kazakh colleagues; he appeared as convinced follower to consolidate bilateral ties, Kazakh counterparts followed similar tendencies. Even minor disputes that have arisen around a number of economic issues were always quickly solved. But apart from actually closely linked political, economic interests, cultural and spiritual kinship, mutual attraction occurred due to latent pressure from Tashkent. Large numbered Uzbek Diaspora in the Kyrgyz part of Fergana valley created the ground for troubles. In a dialogue with Astana such discomfort was hardly seen. Since the early 2000’s economically renewed neighbour brought in a more meaningful partner. Through it there were carried out the majority of commercial transactions, thousands of citizens moved to Kazakhstan for seasonal work, Kazakh capital actively bought up shares of local businesses, resorts and banks, the latter even led to criticism from Kyrgyz elite. Finally, the special arrangement of the parties could be seen from single in the CIS dynastic marriage.
One of the precepts of Kyrgyz diplomacy reads: «small countries should have big friends». This is the main reason for extraordinary attention to maintain strong, yet balanced relationship with Russia, the US and China.
But in 1990s Russia was generally concentrated on domestic issues. Therefore, in the adjacent Central Asian arena, its main interests revolved around heavyweights — Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Speaking about the scale return to Kyrgyzstan was not possible. Western interests to Bishkek also largely decreased.
Major point is that by the end of 1990’s overall development has gone on the decline. The stakes for regional integration were mostly overvalued. The credit of trust given by the West in the early years of independence also rapidly faded away, including due to persistent refusal of Akayev to distance from Moscow and Beijing.  
Purely from an economic standpoint, such an important part as increasing importance of domestic resources was lost. In Kazakhstan, for example, supporters’ role is played by oil and gas complex, in Uzbekistan, deciding not to risk, adopting of market economy was strictly dosed. Kyrgyzstan could not count on the advantage in the first case, but did not hold «controlling stake» in the hands of State in the second. The main exports — wool, cotton, ferrous and nonferrous metals, tobacco — do not provide the necessary currency inflows. Reforms did not give necessary results. External financial injections are used very inefficiently. They are openly spent on various issues that do not influence positively overall development. Part of the money just disappeared. Rather, through ingenious manipulation settled in the pockets of corrupt officials. The economy lost consistency, hoping only for FDI. This could not continue for long.
There is decrease of interest for Bishkek proposed investment portfolios. Foreign businessmen are discouraged by unstable internal political situation and corruption. People did not feel real benefits from reforms and at the same negative emotions grew. Under these conditions opposition movement were getting only stronger. Even some allies of the President from ruling elite moved to the side of fighters with the Akayev’s regime. Askar Akayev, in turn, was less and less inspired by democratic statements. Since the late 1990’s he started strengthening of the presidential vertical.
In parallel there were continues implementation of inefficient projects which were supposed to revive decreasing interest to the republic. One of these was the doctrine of so-called «Silk Road Diplomacy». It was not backed by any specific economic measures, or by the organizational moves, hopes for the next batch of investment by increasing the transit capacity were unsuccessful and thus did not come true.
In 1999, seeing that further cooperation will not bring any fruits, international institutions and donor countries actually decreased their aid programs to the Republic. Selling most of the assets, and failing to take the well developed strategy, the state has not been able to stop the decline. Funds for the maintenance of the national economy afloat chronically lacked. External debt passes for 1.5 billion dollars — a substantial sum on the understanding that the GDP barely reached 5 billion dollars. Living standards dropped to a record low. In the search for earnings about 700 thousand citizens or one third of the working population were forced to go abroad. Industry almost stopped operating. Entrepreneurial activity was limited mainly to barter and transit of goods. Country rapidly moved towards social – economical problems.
By the end of the 1990’s, due to the weakness of power, strengthening of the opposition Kyrgyzstan is increasingly associated not with «an island of democracy», but rather a hotbed of instability. There was an escalation criticism from Western human rights organizations, in particular, the OSCE. On the other hand, the possibility of large-scale crisis in Kyrgyzstan is a matter of extreme importance for the entire region. Therefore, Akayev’s regime has continued to receive support, primarily moral, from CIS partners. In material terms it was small-scale loans, as well as partial debt restructuring.
Batken events of 1999-2000, when the southern regions were attacked by several dozen militants showed the weakness of the Kyrgyz regime; because of this backdrop relations with Uzbekistan were much worsened. Neighbour blamed Bishkek of failing to control the situation in their country and to confront extremists. It was scaring that their spins were clearly manipulated by “hand” of Taliban in Afghanistan.
The situation has changed after September 11, 2001, when US major cities have been targeted by attacks of international terrorism. Already in December, President Akayev yield on the persuasions and agreed to place the NATO Air Force base on its territory for counter-terrorist operation in Afghanistan. Some funds such as the rental base, hiring workers, services received were supposed to enrich state budget. As from the horn of Atlantic side there were again promises for major investment project for received loyalty. Akayev’s regime western critics in regard of human rights and democracy went silent, and this was considered as great joy. Besides a strong blow to the hotbed of international terrorism — the Taliban — would rebound to hit the Islamic radicals in the Fergana Valley, which so severely disturbed Akayev in the recent years.
In general, the views of Bishkek and Washington have coincided very timely. Foreign military was met with great optimism. Many hopes were related to them such as the strengthening of regional stability, and for the reanimation of economy.
Nearly 2 thousand soldiers’ coalition engaged in operations in Afghanistan, located at the airport «Manas» in the suburbs of Bishkek (after some infrastructure developments it has been transformed into a military base «Gansi»). This re-awakened strategic rivalry over the republic that was weak for some time. Kyrgyz Republic activated its contacts with Moscow. Already in 2002 Russian Air Force squadron as Rapid Reaction Force of CIS Collective Security Agreement was located in the airport of Kant city, just a few dozen kilometres from the location of NATO forces. Bishkek considered this move as Moscow’s determination to act firmly to ensure security in Central Asia. Moreover it was stated that “attempts to present these facts as a challenge for States are untrue and made to drive a wedge in the relations of strategic partnership between Russia and USA”.
Changing strategic environment in the region and the policy of «outstretched hand» of Bishkek, as some experts dubbed it, condemned the country to balance between the interests of competing powers. Simply put, the leadership of the republic had to shape foreign policy primarily led by instinct of survival. However, this is probably the fate of most backward states. The existence for the credit for this category — is quite normal. However, it is often directly related to the infringement of their sovereignty
In a meanwhile since 2004 the OSCE and other Western institutions specializing in human rights were often underlining that country is rolling back in democratic developments. They have seen elements of dictatorship in ongoing events in Bishkek thus they have resisted it. «New international political technologies that are used for “velvet revolutions” are quite disturbing” — said Akayev
It was understood by everybody that year 2005 will be difficult for Kyrgyzstan. February -March period is time for election of members of the legislature, the end of October — the election of the head of state. But the chronicle of further developments can not help but astound with its speed and simple plan.
The upsurge of anger because of election results to the parliament has led supporters of opposition candidates to open protests. Manipulation with election results by the regime was used as formal occasion, while true motives were accumulated for years. At the core of this, it was the fight of different clans for power, new redistribution of property and capital. Unemployment and other social problems provided massive amount of people on the streets listening for speeches. Southern regions were first to go on riots. Official Bishkek, at least publicly, was confined to statements about the machinations of «some separatists and drug lords», which are standing behind the demonstrations and ensured that the situation is under full control.
In practice, there was no indication of this control. Passivity of Akayev’s team, and perhaps fear of «blood», and impunity of destructions only provoked the demonstrators. Now their demands were the same — the resignation of the president. After a long period of public apathy and intellectual dependency, people gradually began to be charged by the energy of revolutionary changes.
Passions reached a climax on March 24 when the rebel troops seized key government agencies in Bishkek, including head of state administration building, government was immediately dismissed. Askar Akayev and his family secretly fled the country. In fact, there was a coup d’état, in which the old regime collapsed like a house of cards in a just few days. Streets and squares of cities have been in captivity of uncontrollable crowd, among which were found openly criminal elements. Bishkek was plunged into the atmosphere of turmoil overnight, pillaging and looting. All the power literally collapsed on the shoulders of the opposition and almost crushed them as well.
And yet, the change of political regime in Kyrgyzstan was inevitable and this would happen sooner or later. For many years, this was so clearly signalled by the plight of the people, inter-clan squabbles, in particular disadvantage of the southern regions, endemic corruption in the echelons of power, flawed conduct of the president, his family, who crossed the red permission line. The consensus of elites, which was poorly provided by academician-president, has been forgotten, his political manoeuvres did not bring any results, the reliance on Western democratic community — illusive. So in the air remained the problem of succession of power in meaningful local conditions prerequisite for maintaining stability. The image of the official leadership has fallen so much that any sane candidate for the top post was to distance himself from the regime.
Curious detail: if you assess the ranks of the opposition, in fact, committed the coup in Kyrgyzstan, the main actors were representatives of the Kyrgyz elite. Kurmanbek Bakiyev, in the recent past Prime Minister, Felix Kulov — the ex-vice president and the mayor of the capital, Roza Otunbaeva — former Foreign Minister, Ishenkul Boldzhurova – ex-Minister of Education. The list of names can be supplemented by very well-known names and all of them are «former». But the popularity, creativity, hard work and leadership skills could not be lost. This is obviously proved to be one of the most serious strategic miscalculations of Askar Akayev. Personnel policy manifested in endless rotation of power, when the majority of ministers followed by no less than once a year and a half, was not only reflecting on the efficiency and stability of relevant ministries and agencies moreover the criteria for selection of higher functionaries were not consistent with the interests of the state. They were often dictated not by professionalism and integrity of candidates but the focus was made on unquestioning loyalty and family relations, in such circumstances governor naturally can see everything only through pink glasses.
However, one can not understate the importance of external factors. The sources, for example, suggest that the unrest was preceded by the admission of opposition leaders in the US embassy, whom were even held a briefing on the model change of ruling regimes in Georgia and Ukraine. Some observers consider that the role of «architect» of Kyrgyz revolution is played by the American ambassador in Bishkek, Stephen Young.
From the perspective of the «colour revolutions» this is nothing else but the continuation of positional struggle between the US and Soviet Union. Their goal is final squeezing Russia out of the region as a potential enemy. Among the motivations mentioned also Akayev’s refusal to change the status of «Gansi from temporary to permanent, and in general, his pro-Russian orientation”. The mere ex-president commented as follows: «I have always believed that Kyrgyzstan under the covenant of our ancestors can flourish only in close alliance with Russia. Americans do not like it. After 2001, they settled on the air base in Manas. We went to the creation of the Russian airbase at Kant. I think that it filled the cup of patience of Washington. In each country they want leaders that would focus only on the United States. «
Presidential elections were held already in July 2005, they were held under the watchful care of the OSCE. This time, however, claims of irregularities during the election campaign almost were not heard. In other words, the West, especially the States, gave some credibility to newly elected president Kurmanbek Bakiyev, and Felix Kulov leading the ministers’ cabinet.
Alas, the Americans’ dismay, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, with support of the SOC questioned “the continued US military presence in the republic”. In fact, it turned out that this move was not paradigm shift toward Russia or China, but merely banal desire to increase the rent for “Gansu”.
In any case Kyrgyzstan became the first republic in Central Asia, where the change of power occurred through revolution. It was actively cultivated by the West in mid-1990’s «showcase democracy in the Kyrgyz» in 2005 it broke into smithereens. It is a new galaxy of Kyrgyz politicians, but tryouts of the leaders for the growth trajectory of the country, which fell to the level of the world’s poorest countries, are failing. There are still sulky hopes for investments from abroad that would save the country, however this is unlikely to happen especially in light of destructions and riots that accompanied the Bishkek revolt. One can hardly expect an early cure of traditional society for local wounds, since corruption and clan society are still prevailing. Moreover, they have only relatively modest history of statehood. Finally, they have to seek appropriate measures in response to the challenges that stem from religious extremism, terrorism and peripeteia of the «big game» in the heart of Eurasia.
But «tulip revolution» in Kyrgyzstan gave abundant food for analysts to forecasts for the imminence of similar scenarios for the neighbouring Central Asian republics. Only time will tell if any of them will become prophetic.

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